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RELIGION, NEUTRALITY, AND THE
PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM: EQUAL
TREATMENT OR SEPARATION?
MATTHEW D. DONOVAN*
INTRODUCTION

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... 1
What are the interpretive principles behind the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment? The United States Supreme
Court has traditionally used the term "neutrality" as the decisive
standard for the Government's position toward religion.2 But as
some scholars have suggested, one searches in vain for a clear
definition of the term from the Court.3 In fact, the term
neutrality has taken on a few different meanings over the years. 4
For the purposes of this article, two such definitions will be
explored. 5 One view proposes a kind of separation of church and
state, where the neutral position is effectively aligned with the
secular or non-religious position. The idea here is to keep public
institutions, like our nation's public schools, as secular as
possible by restricting their government benefits and denying
such benefits to any comparable religious institution. The other
* J.D. Candidate, May 2004, University of St. Thomas School of Law;
M.A.,
Theology, 1998, Boston College; B.A., 1996, Marquette University.
I U.S. CONST. amend. I.

See John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause
Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 84 (1986).
3 It must be acknowledged at the outset that Professor Thomas C. Berg largely
2

influenced the choice of the relevant case law and its basic organization around
principles of neutrality. For his enormously comprehensive lectures and texts I am
forever grateful
4 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 878-84 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
5 Another view, sometimes called 'substantive neutrality,' seeks to avoid,
whenever possible, the creation of choice incentives for or against religion. See

Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001-06 (1990); see also infra note 126.
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view proposes equal treatment for all institutions where the
neutral position is one that does not discriminate on the basis of
religious denomination or even non-religion. This position tries
to make sure that government benefits are distributed equally
regardless of the institution's religious or secular nature.
Within the context of education, the Court remains divided
on the meaning of neutrality. 6 With respect to government aid to
religious schools, separation seems to have given way to equal
treatment. 7 However, when the issue involves the public school
curriculum, the Court has held fast to the former view, requiring
8
that our nation's public schools remain strictly secular.
Some proponents of religion in the public school curriculum,
like Charles C. Haynes and Warren A. Nord, have advocated
that equal treatment neutrality should be extended to the public
school curriculum. 9 Haynes and Nord argue, "that if schools are
to be truly neutral they must be truly fair-and this means
including in the curriculum religious as well as secular ways of
making sense of the world when we disagree."' 0 The authors
argue that the traditional constitutional and controversial
concerns for excluding religion from the curriculum can be laid to
rest if religion is presented in an 'objective' manner, usually
within some historical context." Their proposal is not entirely
new, as the Court itself acknowledged in McCollum v. Board of
Education12 over half a century ago.
The "objective" presentation of religion hinted at by the
Court and advocated by Haynes and Nord, however, does have
its problems. Offering a particular religious doctrine objectively,
as it turns out, requires that it be presented without any

6 See Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The Triumph of Pluralism, and its
Effects on Liberty, Equality, and Choice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1123-42 (2003).
7 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653-54 (2002) (upholding a
State voucher program where government aid was distributed equally and whose
recipients, by their own choice, directed such aid toward religious schools); see also
discussion infra § III. But see infra note 126 for another possible justification based
on a third notion of neutrality.
8 See discussion infra Part III.
9 See Jay D. Wexler, Preparingfor the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About
Religion, Civic Education, and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159,
1186-88 (2002).
10 CHARLES C. HAYNES & WARREN A. NORD, TAKING RELIGION SERIOUSLY
ACROSS THE CURRICULUM 8 (1998) [hereinafter TAKING RELIGION SERIOUSLY].
11 See discussion infra Part IV.
12 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948); see discussion infra pp. 25-27.
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reference to truth. But truth is arguably the most fundamental
element of almost all religions, especially Christianity, 13 by
which our nation's founding and subsequent culture has been
largely influenced. A religion that is presented without any
reference to a claim of truth effectively dilutes it into an
undignified form. From the point of view of religion, then, an
objective implementation into the public school curriculum may
not be the best course of action.
My suggestion is that while the Court's separatist position
toward religion in the public school curriculum may seem
anomalous and outmoded in light of its most recent decisions, it
may be the most prudent position to take. The basic structure of
my argument is as follows: Parts I and II begin with a general
survey of the Court's understanding of neutrality towards
religion-both as separation and equal treatment-in the
educational context. Part III then explores neutrality within the
particular context of the public school curriculum. Part IV
presents the Haynes/Nord proposal for integrating religion into
the curriculum. Finally, part V discusses the potential damage
to religion caused by such a proposal.

I. SEPARATION
We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's
right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that
Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.
4
-James Madison'
One way of understanding neutrality toward religion in
public schools is found in the famous Bible-reading case of
Abington School District v. Schempp. 15 In Schempp, the Court
struck down a Pennsylvania law requiring at least ten verses of
'3 For an example of the importance of truth in the context of Christianity, see
John 14:6 ("I am the way, and the truth and the life."); and 1 Corinthians 15:16-19
("For if the dead are not raised, then Christ has not been raised. If Christ has not
been raised, your faith is futile, and you are still in your sins. Then those who also
have died in Christ have perished. If for this life only we have hoped in Christ, we
are of all people most to be pitied.").
14 MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, in THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC
WRITINGS
1, at 302 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) [hereinafter MEMORIAL AND

REMONSTRANCE].

15 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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the Bible to be read at the beginning of each school day, despite a
16
provision permitting students to be excused from the readings.
The Court followed its earlier decision in Engel v. Vitale,'7 by
holding that such official prayers and activities are
unconstitutional in the public schools regardless of any
denominationally neutral wording, and regardless of whether
such prayers are pronounced in a coercive manner. 8 Instead,
the Court established a standard of neutrality forbidding any
law, the "purpose and a primary effect" of which amounts to "the
advancement or inhibition of religion."' 9 Applying the standard,
the Court determined that the required Bible reading had the
effect of advancing religion. 20 This holding also suggested that
the elimination of the practice would not have an inhibiting
effect on religion.2 1 Neutrality in this sense, then, seems to
suggest that silence on matters of religion might be the best
policy. 22 For how better could a public school ensure practices
"neither aiding nor opposing religion"?23
One has to be honest enough, however, to ask further
24
whether such a policy is really silent with respect to religion.
25
Indeed, Justice Stewart raised this very question in his dissent.
A student's daily public school experience is so comprehensive,
he answered, that an absolute and mandated absence of religion
26
would effectively send the opposite message:
[I]f religious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity
in schools, religion is placed at an artificial and state-created
disadvantage.
Viewed in this light, permission of such
exercises for those who want them is necessary if the schools
are truly to be neutral in the matter of religion. And a refusal
to permit religious exercises thus is seen, not as the realization
16

Id. at 223.

17 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding unconstitutional a New York statute prescribing

a non-denominational school prayer as a violation of the Establishment Clause).
18 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 220-22.
19 Id. at 222. "Neutrality" is also used here in the sense that religious exercises
are to be "freely chosen" without any kind of governmental influence. See infra note
126.
20 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223-24.
21 Id. at 225.
22 Id. at 222 (avoiding "the end that official support of the State or Federal
Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies").
23 Id. at 225.
24 For full treatment of the question, see infra Part II.
25 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
26 Id.
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of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a religion
of secularism, or at the least, as government support of the
that religious exercises should be
beliefs of those who think
27
conducted only in private.

From this point of view, then, the position taken by the
majority in Schempp is only neutral on its surface. That is,
insofar as it takes a hands-off approach with respect to religion,
Schempp only appears to be neutral. Saying nothing (or more
properly, mandating that nothing be said) about a particular
topic can have the implied effect of saying something negative
about the same topic; a kind of passive inhibition. 28 At the least,
Schempp seems to establish non-religion as the standard for the
neutral treatment of religion. 29 Since the non-religious position
is the same as the secular position, Schempp effectively
established the secular as the neutral, invoking earlier
30
separatist precedent.
Id.
Consider, for example, the statement from Haynes and Nord:
Traditional textbooks.., that ignored the role of blacks or women in
history and literature were neither neutral nor objective, but as we now
recognize, deeply prejudiced. Similarly, to ignore religious voices is not
neutral; rather, it marginalizes those voices, conveying implicitly their
irrelevance to the search for the truth.
TAKING RELIGION SERIOUSLY, supra note 10, at 47.
29 It is important to note, however, that the majority in Schempp conceded that
"the State may not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively
opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no
religion over those who do believe.' " Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225. For a discussion of
whether or not that directive was or has been followed in the context of the public
school curriculum see infra Part IV.
30 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (following Thomas Jefferson,
"the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of
separation between church and State.' "). This position, as we shall see, is not
foreign to the modern Court. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist observed in his dissent in
Meek v. Pittenger,421 U.S. 349 (1975), that:
The Court apparently believes that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment not only mandates religious neutrality on the part of
government but also requires that this Court go further and throw its
weight on the side of those who believe that our society as a whole should
be a purely secular one.
Id. at 396 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See infra pp. 9-11 for an additional discussion on the Meek case. Or take Justice
Stevens' concurrence in Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), which struck
down as an "impermissible establishment" a New York statute that carved out a
separate school district accommodating Hasidic school children. Justice Stevens
sharply criticized the NY statute as "increas[ing] the likelihood that [the Hasidic
children] would remain within the fold, faithful adherents of their parents' religious
27

28
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The Schempp test of neither advancing nor inhibiting
religion was eventually differentiated and made explicit in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,3 1 which set forth a three-prong test for
Establishment Clause violations.3 2 In Lemon, the Court struck
down both a Rhode Island statute allowing for state-issued
salary supplements to private school teachers of secular subjects,
and a Pennsylvania statute allowing private schools to be
reimbursed by the State for the cost of secular learning
materials. 33 The Court rejected both statutes as failing the third
prong of its test concluding, "that the cumulative impact of the
entire relationship arising under the statutes in each State
involves excessive entanglement between government and
34
religion."
While the Lemon ruling was explicit about the impossibility
of "separation ... in an absolute sense," its concern to keep the
spheres clear of one-another is fairly apparent.3 5 For one, the
majority found it pertinent to point out, with respect to the
Pennsylvania statute, that not only were ninety-six percent of
the State's non-public schools religious in nature, but that many
of these schools were "affiliated with the Roman Catholic
church."3 6 Perhaps the reason for pointing out this seemingly
innocuous fact can be found in the analysis of the Rhode Island
37
statute; the concern there, however, was just as questionable.
The fact that religious authority tends to pervade Rhode Island's
Catholic school system may not be overly tenuous when one
considers that a particular teacher's lesson in a secular subject
might also "constitute instruction in religion."38 But there are at
least two passages where such motivations may not have been
altogether proper. 39

faith" and "provid[ing] official support to cement the attachment of young adherents

to a particular faith." Id. at 711. As if wrenching school-age children from their
faith is a bona-fide state interest!
31 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
32 Id. at 612-13 (requiring that a particular law (1) have a secular purpose; (2)
have a primary effect which "neither advances nor inhibits religion;" and (3) does
not lead to excessive entanglement between government and religion).
33 Id. at 615.
34 Id. at 614.
35 Id. at 614.
36 Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
37 Id. at 617.
38 Id. at 619.
39 Some of Justice Burger's remarks seem to point to the basic anti-Catholic
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Speculations of anti-Catholicism aside, "[tihe Constitution,"
according to Lemon, "decrees that religion must be a private
matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of
private choice ... ."40 This dictates that the Government must,
as much as possible, keep its hands free of any kind of religious
educational enterprise despite the secular nature of the subject
matter being taught. 41 Again, the only way to truly ensure
religious neutrality within the educational is to require that
42
schools remain utterly secular.
The fact that Schempp and Lemon set the precedent for
equating neutrality with the secular perhaps becomes clearer
when considering the decisions that followed. For roughly
fifteen years, the Lemon test was the standard by which the
Court decided Establishment issues. 43 In particular, government
interaction with schools did not fair well during this period. For
example, in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist," the Court struck down three New York programs
concern that Catholic school students are not educated, but indoctrinated into an
un-patriotic disposition or even non-traditional lifestyles. For example, consider the
following statements expressing concern over the potential for religious vocations:
[The nuns'] dedicated efforts provide an atmosphere in which religious
instruction and religious vocations are natural and proper parts of life in
such schools.... ITihe role of teaching nuns in enhancing the religious
atmosphere has led the parochial school authorities to attempt to maintain
a one-to-one ratio between nuns and lay teachers in all schools rather than
to permit some to be staffed almost entirely by lay teachers.
Id. at 615-16.
"[The official school regulations], advis[e] teachers to stimulate interest in religious
vocations and missionary work." Id. at 618. Additionally, Justice Douglas in his
concurrence made reference to Loraine Boettner's Roman Catholicism, one of the
more widely known pieces of Protestant apologetics, which some have even dubbed
"the Bible of the anti-Catholic movement." Id. at 635, n.20; see generally LORRAINE
BOETTNER, ROMAN CATHOLICISM (1962); Catholic community Library's definition of
"The Anti-Catholicism Bible" (stating that this book is known as the "Bible of the
anti-Catholic movement"), available at http://www.catholic.com/library/TheAnti
Catholic_Bible.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2004). For a full treatment of the AntiCatholicism issue in Lemon and in general, see Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism
and Modern Church-StateRelations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121 (2001).
40 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625.
41 This raises perhaps a legitimate question about whether a religious adherent
can really be neutral in the classroom; or the further question of whether the
adherent ought to remain neutral. See discussion infra Part V.
42 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618-19 (expressing serious concerns about the
unconscious influence of teachers or institutions that are religious).
43 MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 483-503
(2002).
44 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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implemented in support of the State's non-public schools. 45 The
first program allowed for direct maintenance grants to schools
for the upkeep of "facilities and equipment." 46 The second
program provided fifty to one hundred dollars per-child tuition
grants for nonpublic school families with incomes below five
thousand dollars. 47 The third program made available a perchild tuition tax credit for non-public school families whose
incomes fell between five thousand and twenty five thousand
48
dollars.
All three programs were struck down on the basis of the
"effects" prong of the Lemon test. 49 The maintenance grants
were invalidated because such funds could possibly be put
toward the maintenance of "the school chapel" or "classrooms in
which religion is taught," thereby having the potential effect of
advancing religion.50 The tuition grants and tax credits were
invalidated because of a similar lack of guarantee that such
funds would be put toward "secular, neutral, and nonideological
purposes." 5 1 In plain language, Nyquist equates the neutral with
the secular.
Several other decisions followed suit, citing this language
from Nyquist. In Levitt v. Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty,52 the Court struck down a New York law that
reimbursed its non-public schools for costs relating to "testing
and recordkeeping." 53 The Court argued that since testing is "an
integral part of the teaching process," there was no way to
ensure that such funds were not used for exams involving
54
religious instruction.
In Meek v. Pittenger,55 the Court struck down a
Pennsylvania law providing its non-public schools with auxiliary
services (including counseling, testing, psychological services,
speech and hearing therapy, and similar services for special-

45 Id. at

797-98.

Id. at 762.
47Id. at 764.
48 Id. at 765-66.
49 Id. at 769.
50 Id. at 774.
51Id. at 780.
52 413 U.S. 472, 474 (1973).
53 Id. at 474, 482.
54 Id. at 481.
55 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
46
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needs students), instructional materials (including periodicals,
photographs, maps and charts, etc.), and equipment (including
projectors, recorders, and laboratory instruments).5 6 The fact
that some seventy-five percent of the State's non-public schools
are religious in nature, 57 argued the Court, "compels the
conclusion that [the Pennsylvania statute] violates the
constitutional prohibition against laws 'respecting an
establishment of religion."' 58 Ensuring that school officials see to
the prevention of such advancement, the Court concluded, would
involve excessive entanglement. 59
In Wolman v. Walter,60 the Court again rejected state
funding (this time in Ohio) of non-public schools for instructional
materials, but extended its prior restrictions to include
transportation funds for school-sponsored field trips. 61 The
Court argued that the requisite monitoring to ensure that there
would be no advancement would, like in Meek, cause excessive
entanglement. 62 Two additional cases, School District of Grand
Rapids v. Ball 63 and Aguilar v. Felton64 round out this separatist
period where neutrality is equated with the secular.
II. EQUAL TREATMENT
For if liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly
to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all
persons alike share in the government to the utmost.
-Aristotle65
A second way of understanding neutrality towards religion
has generally taken hold in the last ten to fifteen years-

56 Id. at 352-55.
57 Id.

at 364.

58 Id. at 372.
59 Id. at 370.

60 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
61 Id. at 233, 255.
62 Id. at 254.
63 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (invalidating a supplemental community education
program because its classes were held on parochial school grounds).
64 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (going even further than Ball by striking down a similar,
yet federally funded program, even though the program provided monitoring
restrictions to see that religion was not taught).
65 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS Bk. IV, 1291a (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1943).
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especially in the school aid context. 66 Here, the term "neutrality"
itself may be most appropriately designated. 67 Similar to the
goals of the former version, the basic motivation behind this
version of neutrality was to eliminate the discrimination of one
religious view over another in order to protect minority religious
viewpoints. 68 The meaning has been expanded, however, to
encompass discrimination between religion and non-religion
since the secular, as the Court has suggested, can sometimes be
69
hostile to religion.
Three kinds of cases have taken on this new understanding
of neutrality. The first set of cases-the cases from which this
view emerged-has to do with the granting of certain tax
benefits to religious organizations. In Walz v. Tax Commission
of New York, 70 the Court upheld a New York statute exempting
certain organizations, including those whose activities were
strictly religious in nature, from property taxes. 71 The majority
did so on the grounds that "[tihe legislative purpose of the
property tax exemption is neither the advancement nor the
inhibition of religion; it is neither sponsorship nor hostility."72
The Court approved of the New York tax scheme, which
consisted of an underlying policy tending to benefit "certain
66 Michael W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY, & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION
AND THE CONSTITUTION 503 (Aspen Law & Business 2002) (2002).
67 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("[Neutrality is] short-form for saying that the Government must neither
legislate to accord benefits that favor religion over nonreligion, nor sponsor a
particular sect ... ").
68 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 706-07 ("[W]hatever the limits of permissible legislative
accommodations may be... it is clear that neutrality as among religions must be
honored.").
69 See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 846
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Th[e] insistence on government neutrality
toward religion explains why we have held that schools may not discriminate
against religious groups by denying them equal access to facilities that the schools
make available to all ....
Withholding access would leave an impermissible
perception that religious activities are disfavored ..
"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 616 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have consistently described the
Establishment Clause as forbidding not only state action motivated by the desire to
advance religion, but also that intended to 'disapprove,' 'inhibit,' or evince 'hostility'
toward religion .... "); Walz, 397 U.S. at 673 (1970) ("Governments have not always
been tolerant of religious activity, and hostility toward religion has taken many
shapes and forms .... "); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249-250,
infra note 97.
70 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
71 Id. at 680.
72 Id. at 672.
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entities that exist in a harmonious relationship to the
community at large," and which refrained from singling out any
group within a class that "include[s] hospitals, libraries,
playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic
groups." 73 Under Walz, then, the concept of neutrality shifts
insofar as both religious and secular organizations, because of
their potential benefits to the community, are treated equally
with respect to property taxes.
The case that really set forth the equal treatment trend in
recent years, however, is Mueller v. Allen.7 4 In Mueller, parents
of parochial school children, under Minnesota law, claimed a
state income tax deduction for educational expenses. 75 The
Court upheld the deduction against state taxpayers'
Establishment arguments on the grounds that this particular
tax break was simply one among many deductions under the
state's tax laws, equally available to all parents.7 6 The Court
paid lip-service to Lemon by applying its test, but held that all
three prongs had been satisfied since: 1) the deduction was
instituted towards the state's interest in the education of all its
citizens (a secular purpose); 77 2) the deduction, like all other
deductions, was equally available to all parents (no advancing or
inhibiting effect); 78 and 3) the requirement that state officials
monitor the nature of the textbooks for religious content was
79
fairly benign (no entanglement).
The language of Mueller emphasizes neutrality as equal
treatment:
[The Minnesota statute] permits all parents-whether their
children attend public school or private-to deduct their
children's educational expenses ....
[A] program... that
neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of
citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the
80
Establishment Clause.
The holding in Mueller, therefore, effectively adjusted Lemon's
definition of neutrality, where any kind of government benefit to
73

Id. at 672-73.

74 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
75 Id. at 390.
76 Id. at 397.
77 Id. at 395.
78 Id. at 396-97.
79 Id. at 403.
80 Id. at 398-99.
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religious organizations advanced religion, to a new definition
where government benefits only advance religion if more is given
to the religious organization than other organizations.
A second set of cases establishing neutrality in this new
sense deals with granting religious groups access to government
property. 8 1 In Widmar v. Vincent,8 2 the University of Missouri
forbade a registered student religious group from meeting on
campus for prayer and discussion. 83 The University's policy of
denying use of its facilities "for purposes of religious worship or
religious teaching,"8 4 was an effort to ensure, inter alia, its
compliance with the Establishment Clause. 85
Since
approximately one hundred other registered student groups were
given access to the University's facilities,8 6 and since the
presence of religiously natured groups was not dominating, the
Court argued that no threat of advancement existed.8 7 "It does
not follow," the majority pointed out, "that an 'equal access'
policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment
Clause cases."8 8 For while "[i]t is possible-perhaps even
foreseeable-that religious groups will benefit from access to
University facilities. .. , [t]his Court has explained that a
religious organization's enjoyment of merely 'incidental' benefits

81 In addition to the cases discussed infra, see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-95 (1993) (allowing evening use of public
school classrooms for a religious group to show films on family and child rearing
because such use was extended to other community groups and the films fit the
social and civic purposes of the law).
82 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
83 Id. at 265.
84 Id. at 265 n.3.
85 Id. at 270-71. While the Establishment issue is most relevant for the
purposes of this paper, it is important to note that Widmar also addressed a free
speech issue. Id. at 269-70. With respect to free speech, the Court applied strict
scrutiny since the University's restrictions were based on the subject matter or
content (in this case religion). Id. The University argued that it had a compelling
government interest in ensuring that government and religion remain separate. Id.
at 270. The Court rejected this argument as insufficient, holding that "[W]e are
unpersuaded that the primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of
discourse, would be to advance religion." Id. at 273. Merely permitting religious
speech on the part of private individuals, the Court argued, does not constitute
government sponsorship. See id. at 271 (discussing that a party will not violate the
Establishment Clause if it institute satisfies the three-prong test established by the
court).
86 Id. at 274.
87 Id. at 275.

8 Id. at 271.

RELIGION, NEUTRALITY, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS

does not violate the prohibition against the 'primary
advancement' of religion."89 Again Widmar, like the tax benefit
cases, understood neutrality with respect to religion primarily as
equal treatment.
Following the Court's ruling in Widmar, Congress, by
enacting the Equal Access Act, 90 extended students' religious
assembly rights to public high school students, so long as other
groups are given the same opportunity. 9 1 The statute required
that such religiously
natured extra-curricular
groups must be
92
93
"voluntary,"

"student-initiated,"

and

"student-direct[ed]." s4

No school may officially sponsor such groups, 9 5 and no school
official can actively participate in such a group.9 6 In Board of
Education v. Mergens,9 7 the Court upheld the Act 98 reiterating
the equal treatment principle:
Although a school may not itself lead or direct a religious club,
a school that permits a student-initiated and student-led
religious club to meet after school, just as it permits any other
student group to do, does not convey a message of state
approval or endorsement of the particular religion. Under the
Act, a school with a limited open forum may not lawfully deny
access to a Jewish students' club, a Young Democrats club, or a
philosophy club devoted to the study of Nietzsche. To the extent
that a religious club is merely one of many different studentinitiated voluntary clubs, students should perceive no message
of government endorsement of religion. Thus, we conclude that
the Act does not, at least on its face and as applied to [the high
school], have the primary effect of advancing religion. 99
The equal treatment principle with respect to student group
assembly has even been held to apply in the elementary school

273.
90 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000).
91 Id. at § 4071(a).
92 Id. at § 4071(c)(1).
93 Id.
94 Id. at § 4071(c)(5).
95 Id. at § 4071(c)(2).
96 Id. at § 4071(c)(3).
97 496 U.S. 226 (1990). The Court in Mergens also pointed out the potential
hostility of exclusion. "Indeed, the message is one of neutrality rather than
endorsement; if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others,
then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion." Id. at 248.
89 Id. at

98 Id. at 252-53.
99 Id at 252.
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context. In Good News Club v. Milford Central Schools, 10 0 the
Court admitted, "it cannot be said that the danger that children
would misperceive the endorsement of religion is any greater
than the danger that they would perceive a hostility toward
[religion] if the Club were excluded from the public forum." 1° 1
The kind of neutrality introduced in the tax benefit cases, then,
was extended to mean equal access for religious organizations to
government property as well.
The final set of cases interpreting neutrality as equal
treatment is the one encompassing the school voucher cases. In
10 2
Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,
the Court upheld a Washington statute that funded "visually
handicapped persons to overcome vocational handicaps," even
when such funds were used to further one's ministerial
aspirations. 10 3 Petitioner Larry Witters, who suffered from a
"progressive eye condition," used the funds to attend a private
Bible college "in order to equip himself for a career as a pastor,
The Court rejected the
missionary, or youth director."'10 4
Establishment Clause claim, emphasizing the generally
applicable (neutral) nature of the Washington program, which
was "in no way skewed towards religion."' 0 5 The Court argued:
[The program] creates no financial incentive for students to
undertake sectarian education. It does not tend to provide
greater or broader benefits for recipients who apply their aid to
religious education, nor are the full benefits of the program
limited, in large part or in whole, to students at sectarian
On the contrary, aid recipients have full
institutions.
expend
vocational rehabilitation aid on wholly
opportunity to
a practical matter have rather
secular education, and as
10 6
greater prospects to do so.
In Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills School District,107 the Court
followed Witters with respect to the constitutionality of a
James Zobrest, a deaf
generalized educational program. 0 8
100 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
101 Id. at 100.

102 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
103

Id. at 483.

104

Id.

105

Id. at 488.

106 Id. (citation omitted).

107 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
108 Id. at 9-10.
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Catholic high school student, was denied assistance under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which
provided sign language interpreters to deaf students in
schools. 10 9 The claim was that such assistance would play an
essential role in the religious "inculcation" and "development" of
students educated in religious schools.11 0 Again, the Court
emphasized the generally applicable nature of the program in
ruling on its neutrality:
The service at issue in this case is part of a general government
program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child
qualifying as 'disabled' under the IDEA .... When the
government offers a neutral service on the premises of a
sectarian school as part of a general program... it follows
under our prior decisions that provision of that service does not
offend the Establishment Clause. 1 1'

In Rosenberger v. University of Virginia,112 the Court held
that the University of Virginia, a state university, could
financially support student religious publications by paying their
printing costs as long as it does so for other non-religious

publications. 113

Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the

University of Virginia114 was a publication exhorting its
publishers as well as other university students to remain true to
115
their Christian faith through a relationship with Jesus Christ.
The University denied paying Wide Awake's printing costs in
order to, inter alia, avoid an Establishment Clause violation by
supporting a group which "primarily promotes or manifests a
particular belie[fi in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."" l6
By the time certiorari was granted, the Establishment Clause
issue had been substantially assuaged. 117 The Court nonetheless
addressed it considerably reminding the reader that:
[A] significant factor in upholding governmental programs in
the face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality
towards religion ....We have held that the guarantee of
109

Id. at 3-4.

110 Id. at 5.
1 Id. at 10.
112 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
13
114

Id. at 844.

Id. at 826.

115 Id.
116
117

Id. at 823 (alteration in original).
Id. at 837-38.
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neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government,
following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends
viewpoints,
benefits to recipients whose ideologies and
18
including religious ones, are broad and diverse.1
Picking up the printing costs of such publications as Wide
Awake: A Christian Perspective, 119 argued the Court, could only
be "in recognition of the diversity and creativity of student
life."'120 To remain neutral, then, the publication should have
been eligible for the same financial support as any other
2
University publication.' '
Finally, in its most recent decision on these matters, the
Court upheld a Cleveland school-voucher program providing
tuition and tutorial aid to parents of children in the Cleveland
City School District in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.122 In an
effort to remedy the problems related to some of "the worst
performing public schools in the Nation," Ohio enacted the "Pilot
Project Scholarship Program."'123 Under the program, parents
could use the state funds either toward the tuition costs of
participating private schools or tutorial expenses to supplement
their child's public school experience. 24 The Court's neutrality
analysis with respect to the emphasis on equal treatment echoed
its recent precedent:
[T]he Ohio program is neutral in all respects toward religion. It
is part of a general and multifaceted undertaking by the State
of Ohio to provide educational opportunities to the children of a
failed school district ....[It] permits the participation of all

schools within the district, religious or non-religious ....
Program benefits are available to participating
families on
25
neutral terms, with no reference to religion.

118 Id. at 839.
119 Id. at 840.
120

Id.

121 Another seemingly important factor in the Court's neutrality analysis was
the indirect nature of the University's financial support. The money allocated for
the printing costs of the various student publications was not given directly to the

publication, but to the printer with whom the University had contracted. Id. at
843-44.

Thus, the Court pointed out that "[b]y paying outside printers, the

University in fact attains a further degree of separation from the student
publication." Id. at 844.
122
123
124
125

536 U.S. 639, 641 (2002).
Id. at 644.
Id. at 645-646.
Id. at 653.
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And so, even with respect to government aid to religious
schools-the very context within the Court's former
understanding of neutrality had reached its high mark-a new
principle, establishing equal treatment as the standard, has
seemingly become the norm. 126
III. NEUTRALITY AND THE CURRICULUM

They are poetic and pleasing to the majority of hearers, but
the more poetic they are the less they should be heard by
children ....
-Plato127
While the equal treatment principle with respect to religion
has seemed to prevail in the context of tax benefits, 128 access to
government property, and school aid, 129 it has not been adopted

126 It should also be noted that these cases (Mueller, Witters, Zobrest, and
Zelman especially) provide evidence for the third possible understanding of
['substantive'] neutrality toward religion. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
In Witters and in Zelman, the Court showed an interest in leaving the choice of
using government funds for religious schools to the individual parents. The Court
in Zelman summarized:
Mueller, Witters and Zobrest thus make clear that where a government aid
program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance
directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to
religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent
private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause.
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
This view is unique in that it requires equal treatment in general, except in cases
where a generally applicable law discourages a particular religious practice. Even
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990), arguably justified this third view by conceding that "leaving
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those
religious practices that are not widely engaged in .. " Id. at 890 (holding that
where the burdensome law in question is generally applicable, no religious
exemptions need be granted).
127 PLATO, REPUBLIC Bk. III, 387b (G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett Publishing
Co. 1974) (1982). This quote is taken from the beginning of Bk. III of the Republic
where Socrates had convinced his interlocutors to banish from their city certain
poets whose teachings on the gods were deemed to be dangerous to the cause of civil
justice.
128 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) (emphasizing
equal treatment and holding that absent extraordinary circumstances one's religion
should not affect one's legal rights, duties, or benefits).
129 See id.
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in the context of the public school curriculum, 130 where the
separation principle of Schempp, Lemon, and Nyquist seems to
hold sway. In Epperson v. Arkansas,'3 1 for example, the Court
invalidated a state law forbidding the teaching of evolution in
public schools.' 32 The Court struck down the law as having a
religious purpose, drawing its rationale from certain
advertisements encouraging adoption of the law, and on the
nature of certain letters to the editor of the Arkansas Gazette
from the public on the matter. 33 Thus, the Court forbade the
state legislature, which normally has wide discretion in setting
the curriculum for its own schools, from removing a particular
scientific theory from the curriculum. 3 4 But a holding that
forbids a state from removing a secular theory from the
curriculum effectively elevates the secular position over the
religious, or establishes the secular as the baseline by which
Establishment violations may be determined. 13 5 Thus, Epperson,
like the Schempp/Lemon/Nyquist line, seems to equate
neutrality toward religion with the secular. 136
This becomes clearer in light of Edwards v. Aguillard,3 7 in
which the Court, some twenty years later, again took up the
evolution/curriculum issue. 1 38 In response to the Epperson
decision and in an effort to conform to the new understanding of
neutrality as equal treatment, the Louisiana legislature enacted
the Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-

130

See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987).

131393 U.S. 97 (1968).
132 Id. at 107, 109.
133 Id. at 108 n.16.
134 Id. at 106-17.
135 See supra Part II.
136 It would be unfair,

of course, not to acknowledge the Court's explicit
statements to the contrary:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in
matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to
any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or
promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against
the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.
Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103-04.
This language notwithstanding, the main thrust of the opinion seems to elevate the
secular to a higher plane than religion.
137 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
138 Id. at 596-97.
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Science in Public School Instruction Act. 139 The Act mandated a
collaborative teaching of both "creation science"' 140 and evolution
whenever the subject of human origin was taught.' 4 ' The Court
rejected the Louisiana statute as having a "sham"'142 secular
purpose, noting again the religious motivations of the legislative
history. 143 The Court stated that "[t]he preeminent purpose of
the [Act,] was clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a
supernatural being created humankind."'144 Thus, the precedent
set in Epperson was furthered: states are not only prohibited
from removing a secular subject from its public school
curriculum, but are also prohibited from adding a supplemental
presentation of its religious counterpart. In this sense, as
Justice Scalia argued in his dissent, Aguillard amounts to a flatout rejection-at least in the context of the public school
curriculum-of neutrality as equal treatment of both religion
45
and non-religion.1
Public school curricula across the nation have been
challenged because, as the Court has suggested, the secular can
be hostile to religion. 146 These challenges, however, have not
faired well. 147 One reason is because state governments have
demonstrated compelling interests in the democratic values
inculcated by secular curricula.'48 For example, in Mozert v.

'39

Id. at 599-602.
at 592 (The term creation science "embodies the religious belief that a

140 Id.

supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of humankind.").
141 Id. at 581.
142 Id. at 587.
143 Id. at 592-93 ("The state senator repeatedly stated that scientific evidence
supporting his religious views should be included in the public school curriculum to
redress the fact that the theory of evolution incidentally coincided with what he
characterized as religious beliefs antithetical to his own. The legislation therefore
sought to alter the science curriculum to reflect endorsement of a religious view that
is antagonistic to the theory of evolution.").
144 Id. at 591.
145 See id. at 628-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). [T]here is no basis whatever for
concluding that the [secular] purpose... is a "sham." To the contrary, the Act
pursues that purpose plainly and consistently. It requires that, whenever the
subject of origins is covered, evolution be "taught as a theory, rather than as proven
scientific fact" and that scientific evidence inconsistent with the theory of evolution
(viz., 'creation science') be taught as well. Id. (internal citations omitted).
146 See id. at 616.
147 See infra pp. 21-25.
148 Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 242 (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that a
public secular education is one with "uniquely democratic values," and that the
choice between public secular education and some form of a private or Sectarian one
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Hawkins County Board of Education,149 the Sixth Circuit argued
at great length for the "fundamental values" 150 taught in the
public schools including: "civil tolerance" and diversity, 151 critical
thinking, and "self-government." 152 Similarly, in Smith v. Board
of School Commissioners,153 the Eleventh Circuit justified certain
public school textbooks as "a governmental attempt to instill
in... public school children such values as independent thought,
maturity, self-reliance
tolerance of diverse views, self-respect,
154
and logical decision-making."
These decisions are not without Supreme Court guidance.
Both Mozert and Smith drew upon the Court's own
understanding of the role of education and the values it ought to
inculcate. 55 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 156 the Court accepted the
State's proposition (following Jefferson) "that some degree of
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate
effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are
to preserve freedom and independence ....[E]ducation prepares
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in
57
society."1
Value education of this sort, from the Court's point of view,
seems imperative for the health of the nation. Consider Chief
158
Justice Warren's statements in Brown v. Board of Education:

should be vested to each individual parent.).
149 827 F.2d 1058, 1061-62, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that compelled
exposure to secular values in the public schools is insufficient to establish a burden
on religious freedom).
150 Id. at 1068.
151 Id. at 1068-69.
152 Id. at 1070-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
153 827 F.2d 684, 690 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that certain challenged textbooks
neither sufficiently endorsed an alleged religion of "secular humanism," nor
disapproved of theistic religion).
154 Id. at 692.
155See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 72, 75-80 (1979) (holding that public
schoolteachers' "governmental function" of imparting upon their students important
social and cultural values, reduces the level of scrutiny applied by the Court in cases
where lawful resident aliens are not considered for employment (citing Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)
(holding that the First Amendment does not protect sexually lewd speech in the
context of the public school because of its mission to inculcate certain fundamental
values).
156 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
157 Id. at 221.
158 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments ....It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship ....[I]t is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
159
him to adjust normally to his environment.
Consider also Justice Brennan's simple declaration in Plyler
v. Doe:160 "[E]ducation has a fundamental role in maintaining
the fabric of our society."'16 There is little doubt, then, that the
government has some interest in the subject matter of the
education of its citizens.
However, what if the values of one's particular religious
beliefs do not completely square with the requisite values for the
health of our society? Again, the appellant in Mozert, a selfdescribed "born again Christian,"1 62 claimed that certain
textbooks were indoctrinating her children with offensive ideas
relating to what she called "secular humanism" and "futuristic
supernaturalism." 63 She argued that ideas relating to mental
telepathy, evolution, pacifism and magic conflicted with her
family's Christian worldview. 16 4 In fact, seven families (fourteen
parents and seventeen children) 165 objected to the texts, raising
further conflicts relating to role identity, social globalism, and
the presentation of other religions.' 6 6 The families claimed that:
[Their] sincere religious beliefs.., are contrary to the values
taught or inculcated by the ...

textbooks and that it is a

violation of the religious beliefs and convictions of the...
students to be required to read the books and a violation of the
religious beliefs of the ...

parents to permit their children to

167
read the books.
In Smith, the appellee argued that the public schools,
through the use of certain textbooks, were actually establishing
a secular religion. 168 The texts primarily looked to "humanistic

159

Id. at 493.

160 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
161

162
163

Id. at 221.
Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1062.

164 Id.
165
166
167
168

Id. at 1060.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1060.
Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 688 (11th Cir. 1987).
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psychology" for guidance in establishing a moral ethos based
upon individualism and relativism for the students. 169 The
district court, which ruled in favor of appellant, stated that
"[t]his highly relativistic and individualistic approach constitutes
170
the promotion of a fundamental faith claim" in its own right.
The court found that such a claim flew in the face of any theistic
religion that took the notion of natural law seriously, and the
consequences for disobedience may echo well beyond the
grave.' 71 The ethical methodology of the State's public schools,
by contrast, "assumes that self-actualization is the goal of every
human being, that man has no supernatural attributes or
component, that there are only temporal and physical
consequences for man's actions, and that these results, alone,
1 72
determine the morality of an action."
Whether one takes seriously these particular arguments,
one should at least acknowledge some fairly significant
differences between the goals of liberal democracy and those of
Christianity-differences that may reasonably be interpreted as
conflicting. 73 To be sure, the Gospels propose a way of life that
in some sense does not equate with the political life and its
requisite values. 174 Christianity is a doctrinal religion, which is
to say that it is centered on right teaching (orthodoxy).' 75
Therefore, it is not, strictly speaking, a law. 76 Furthermore,
Jesus' teachings effectively re-orient human goals or ends to a
different kind of life; namely, the eternal life-a life secured by a
169 Id. at 690-91 (quoting the district court's conclusions about the texts in
question: " 'the student must determine right and wrong based only on his own
experience, feelings and [internal] values' and that 'the validity of a moral choice is
only to be decided by the student' ") (alternation in original).
170 Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 986 (S.D. Ala. 1987).
171 Id. at 987.
172 Id. 986-87.
173 See generally ERNEST L. FORTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS, VIRTUE, AND THE

COMMON GOOD: UNTIMELY MEDIATIONS ON RELIGION AND POLITICS (J. Brian

Benestad, ed., 1996) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS] (arguing, inter alia, that the
origins of modern liberal democracy are to be traced to a political philosophy, the
fundamental tenets of which are at intentional odds with the tenets of an earlier
political philosophy within which Christianity arose and, in some sense, had allied
itself).
174 See John 18:36 (New American); Matthew 5:3-12, 6:19-21, 24-34 (New
American).
175 By contrast, consider how Judaism from which Christianity arose and Islam
with which it was later to contend are both legalistic in nature-that is to say, are
centered around right conduct (orthopraxy).
176 Galatians5:18 (New American).
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King not related to Caesar, the Founding Fathers, or any other
worldly regime. 177 Sacrificing religion for a secular or even
politically based value-education in the schools, therefore, may
not rest neutrally in the minds and souls of some religious
children and their parents.
In any case, if the events of 9/11 have taught us anything, it
is that religion is indeed a powerful historical force. A student
would (indeed, should) expect to encounter such ramifications in
her most basic historical studies. Ironically, however, a number
of studies conducted in the 1980's suggest that religion--even as
a historical subject-has been largely ignored in the public
school curriculum.17 8 One study "examined the treatment of
[religion] and traditional family values" in several widely used
public school textbooks and concluded there to be "a systematic
denial of the history, heritage, beliefs, and values of a very large
segment of the American people." 179 Another summarized, "not
one of [the history texts surveyed] acknowledges, much less
emphasizes, the great religious energy and creativity of the
United States."'180 Yet another study determined that "religion is
simply not treated as a significant element in American life-it
is not portrayed as an integrated part of the American value
system or as something that is important to individual
Americans." 18 1 An overarching and common conclusion among
all these studies suggests that, at the very least, the systematic
neglect of religion in public schools sends a message that religion
is unimportant in the formation of American citizens. 8 2 Such a
trend, if it indeed exists, does not reflect neutrality.

177

John 14:6.

178 See PAUL VITz, CENSORSHIP:

EVIDENCE OF BIAS IN OUR CHILDREN'S

TEXTBOOKS 1-4 (1986) [hereinafter CENSORSHIP]; Paul Vitz, Religion and
Traditional Values in Public School Textbooks, 84 PUB. INT. 79, 80-83 (1986)
[hereinafter Religion and Traditional Values]; PAUL GAGNON, DEMOCRACY'S
UNTOLD STORY: WHAT THE WORLD HISTORY TEXTBOOKS NEGLECT (1987); CHARLES
C. HAYNES, TEACHING ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICAN SECONDARY
SCHOOLS (1985); PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, LOOKING AT HISTORY: A REVIEW
OF MAJOR U.S. HISTORY TEXTBOOKS (1986) [hereinafter PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN

WAY].

179 Religion and Traditional Values,

supra note 178, at 83, 90.

180 CENSORSHIP, supra note 178, at 56.
181 PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, supranote 178, at 3.
182 See generally WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION:
RETHINKING A NATIONAL DILEMMA 138-59 (1986).
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What, then, are the options for parents who do not want
their children exposed to such hostility, or at least on some level,
find religion to be an important enough factor to be included in
the educational formation of their children? After all, children
are in school for roughly eight hours a day, five days a week,
forty weeks of the year, twelve years of their lives. 183 One option
is to send them to religious schools. After Zelman, this seems
like a legitimate option, especially for those parents who might
not otherwise be able to afford such schools. Another option,
however, is to find a way to introduce religion into the public
school curriculum without violating the Establishment Clause.
Indeed, the Court itself has suggested that there might be
room for religion in the curriculum, even under its former
separatist understanding of neutrality. 18 4 Justice Jackson,
concurring in McCollum, stated that "it is a proper, if not
indispensable, part of preparation for a worldly life" to
understand the effect of religion on society. 8 5 "One can hardly
respect a system of education," he claimed, "that would leave the
student wholly ignorant of the currents of religious
thought ... -186
Justice Clark, writing for the majority in Schempp,
suggested that "it might well be said that one's education is not
complete without a study of comparative religion or the history
of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization.
It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its
literary and historic qualities."'187 Justice Goldberg, in his
concurrence, provided further justification and even a general
methodology for finding a place for religion in the curriculum:
Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the
significance of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in
and worship God and that many of our legal, political and
personal values derive historically from religious teachings.
Government must inevitably take cognizance of the existence of
religion and, indeed, under certain circumstances the First
Amendment may require that it do so. And it seems clear to
183 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 313 (1962) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
184 McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 237 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
185 Id. at 236.
186

Id.

187 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
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me... that the Court would recognize the propriety of...
teaching about religion, as distinguished from the teaching of
188
religion, in the public schools.
Justice Goldberg's distinction between 'teaching of and
'teaching about' religion proved to be an important one. The
Court in Epperson would later help to spell out its meaning:
"[The] study of religions and of the Bible from a literary and
historic viewpoint, presented objectively as part of a secular
program of education, need not collide with the First
Amendment's prohibition .... "189
Just what does an 'objective presentation' of religion mean?
Justice Souter, in his dissent in Rosenberger, provided a fairly
lucid explanation. 9 0 An objective presentation of religion, he
suggested, was a "descriptiveexamination of religious doctrine or
even of ideal [religious] practice" or an "analysis and
interpretation of biblical texts. ."..",191On the other hand, "[a]
straightforward exhortation to enter into a relationship with
God... and to satisfy a series of moral obligations derived from
the teachings [of a particular religion]," he argued, was not an
objective presentation. 192
This distinction provides the
foundation for the proposal of the implementation of religion into
the curriculum as developed by Haynes and Nord.
IV. THE HAYNES/NORD PROPOSAL

The very power of [modern education] depends on the fact
that [it is] dealing with a boy: a boy who thinks he is 'doing' his
'English prep' and has no notion that ethics, theology, and
politics are all at stake.
193
-C.S. Lewis

Id. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
190 Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia., 515 U.S. 819, 863-99 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
191 Id. at 866-67 (emphasis added).
192 Id. at 867 (explaining how Justice Souter quoted at length several articles
from Wide Awake, to suggest that its contents were far from objective). See supra
text accompanying notes 114WC'15, for a description of the stated purpose of Wide
Awake.
193 C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 3 (1957).
188

189
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In response to the results of the studies of the 1980's, two
leading scholars on these matters, Charles C. Haynes and
Warren A. Nord, collaborated on the now widely referenced,
Taking Religion Seriously Across the Curriculum.194 In their
book, Haynes and Nord argued that religion ought to be included
in the curriculum for civic, constitutional, and educational
reasons.19 5 They recognized and emphasized that the inclusion
of religion in the curriculum is conditioned upon its objective
presentation to students. 196 The authors ultimately suggested a
method of implementation that would achieve this goal.19 7
Haynes and Nord believed that there are civic and
constitutional justifications for including religion in the public
school curriculum. 19s8 Their basic argument was as follows: They
began by suggesting that our nation's founding is based on the
principles of tolerance and respect. A representative democracy
requires dialogue and truth, especially in a pluralist society,
which requires that citizens take each other seriously. The
framework for taking each other seriously in the context of
religion, they argued, was laid out in the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment. The First Amendment requires that the
Government be neutral with respect to religion, and, according
to the authors, neutrality means equal treatment as between
religions, and as between religion and non-religion.
For Haynes and Nord, then, "[t]he solution is for schools and
communities to openly and honestly address religious liberty in
public education."'199 The authors thus "propose a... model that
is consistent with First Amendment principles: the 'civil public
school,' where people of all faiths and no faith are treated with
fairness and respect."200 At the outset, they noted that America
is indeed a religious nation. 20 1 If it is a civic responsibility of
public schools to "take the public seriously," then the public
schools must take religion seriously. 20 2

194See TAKING RELIGION SERIOUSLY, supranote 10.
,'s Id. at 15-33.
19GId. at 46-57.
197 Id. at 61-198.
198 See generally id. at 15-33.
199 Id. at 15.
200 Id. at 16.
201 Id. at 1.
202 Id. at 19.
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Haynes and Nord also believed in the existence of an
educational justification for including religion in the public
school curriculum. 2 3 The authors assumed that our educational
system strives to make available a liberal education to children.
A liberal education, they suggested, is "an education that enables
students to think in an informed and critical way about the
world."20 4 It placed students "in some position to responsibly
judge what is true and good all things considered. '205 An
education that excludes a whole category of worldviews,
however, is not a liberal education. In fact, they argued that the
one-sidedness of the current system actually indoctrinates
students to believe that religion does not matter, is unimportant,
or is simply not a valid resource for understanding the world.
This, they concluded, does a great injustice to our children. A
truly liberal education-that is, the kind of education to which
the nation ought to be committed-requires that "religious voices
be included in the curricular conversation. 20 6
Haynes and Nord suggested seven principles for guidance in
implementing religion into the public school curriculum. 20 7 The
first principle, "diversity and fairness,"' 20 8 aids in asking and
answering the question about which religions to include and how
much emphasis to place on them. 20 9 Since neutrality dictates
that truth cannot be the standard for answering these questions,
the authors suggested a "criterion of influence." 210 Under this
standard, the inclusion of and emphasis on a particular religion
is determined according to its relation to the cultural situation of
the students and subject matter being taught. Thus, "in a course
on American history," for example, "it would be foolish to give
equal time to Christianity and Confucianism because the
influence of Christianity on America has been so much
greater."2 11

203 See generally id. at 35-57.
204 Id. at 35.
205 Id. at 57.
206 Id. at 57.
207 See generally id. at 46-55.
208 Id. at 47.
209 Id. at 47-49.
210 Id. at 48.
211

Id.
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The second principle concerns "the many dimensions of
religion." 2 12 It reminds the teacher that all religions, to one
degree or another, consist of doctrines, narratives, ethics, rituals,
experiences, institutions, art, and customs. Different spiritual
traditions emphasize some elements over others.
These
differences, argue Haynes and Nord, should be brought to light
when presented to students so that each religion is treated
squarely on its own terms.
It is important that students understand a particular
"religion from the inside." 21 3 This third principle invokes the old
hermeneutical rule of thumb that one should seek to understand
the author as the author understood himself. In other words, in
presenting a particular religion, the teacher should allow the
experts or adherents to speak for themselves. This, argued
Haynes and Nord, required empathy on the part of the student
and the teacher so that the world can be understood, to the
extent that it is possible, through the consciousness of the
particular religion being studied.
It is also important that the student understand a particular
"religion from the outside."2 14 This principle calls for a more
comparative approach so that students can see how religions
relate to one another. Students ought to notice commonalities
and make distinctions between different religions. They should
be able to frame their studies of particular religions in their
proper historical context in order to better judge for themselves
the worth of such a perspective.
Both "primary and secondary sources" should be consulted
in presenting a particular religion. 215 In emphasizing primary
sources, Haynes and Nord again stressed the importance of
authenticity and authority, but they also suggested that
secondary sources may be helpful-indeed, even necessary-for a
more straightforward presentation of a particular religious
perspective. The ideal, they argued, was to strike a balance of
both primary and secondary texts.
It is important that the student be able to distinguish
between "pluralism and relativism."21 6 A pluralistic approach to
See id. at
213 See id. at
214 See id. at
215 Id. at 53.
216 See id. at
212

49; see generally id. at 49-50.
50; see generally id. at 50-51.
51; see generally id. at 51-52.
53; see generally id. at 53-55.
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the study of various religions, the authors argued, calls for the
kind of tolerance and respect for one another envisioned by our
Founders. A relativistic approach, on the other hand, suggests
that all religious, and non-religious, perspectives are of equal
validity or invalidity, thus leaving the student with the bleak
outlook of postmodernism. Teachers, when presenting religion,
must remind their students of what is at stake for the religious
person; namely, the truth. After all, history's greatest religious
thinkers spent the better part of their lives engaged in deep
conversation about truth. Haynes and Nord suggest that an
objective presentation of religion involves inviting students into
that conversation by showing them the arguments without
making official judgments.
Finally, a truly objective presentation of religion requires
"competence" 217 on the part of teachers and school officials. 2 18
Haynes and Nord proposed "teacher education institutions" 219 to
teach teachers and other school officials the justifications and
boundaries for including religion in the public school curriculum,
and to impart sufficient knowledge of various religions and how
they relate to the subjects they teach. The authors proposed
certification standards to ensure quality and knowledgeable
presentation.
They also urged school boards to set and
implement sound policies and to adopt sound textbooks.
Haynes and Nord then called for the kind of neutrality that
the Court now employs with respect to the public school
curriculum in matters relating to tax benefits, access to public
property, and school aid. Such a position would require that
religion, a significant part of most Americans' lives, be given
equal treatment as a legitimate worldview in the nation's public
schools. This treatment would take an objective form and fairly
present the religious alternatives while refraining from official
judgment with respect to them. This aspect of refraining from
official judgment, however, is what renders the Haynes/Nord
proposal problematic.

Id. at 55.
218 See generally id. at 55-57.
217

219 Id. at 56.
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V. TEACHING 'OBJECTIVELY' AND THE DANGERS OF HISTORICISM

Historicism is the ultimate outcome of the crisis.., of
modern political philosophy... [which] consists precisely in this,
that the difference between intellectuals and philosophers-a
difference formerly known as the difference between gentlemen
and philosophers, on the one hand, and the difference between
sophists or rhetoricians and philosophers, on the other-becomes
blurred and finally disappears.
220
-Leo Strauss
Does the Haynes and Nord approach resolve the problems
set forth by the parents in Mozert and Smith, who feared that
their children would lose their religious worldviews to those of
the modern, secular, educational institution? After all, the
textbooks and courses of study at issue in those cases were
somewhat neutral in that they were not without the examination
of religion. 221 Could the purely 'objective' approach outlined by
Haynes and Nord actually be counter-productive to the
formation and development of one's faith? Does it do justice to
religion, not just as a subject of historical import and interest,
220 LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 34 (1955). Elsewhere, Strauss
explained the crucial difference between genuine philosophy and the "politicization
of philosophy" in terms of the distinction between "political philosophy" on the one
hand, and "political thought" on the other:
Political thought is, as such, indifferent to the distinction between opinion
and knowledge; but political philosophy is the conscious, coherent and

relentless effort to replace opinions about the political fundamentals by
knowledge regarding them. Political thought may not be more, and may
not even intend to be more, than the expounding or the defense of a firmly
held conviction or of an invigorating myth .... A political thinker who is
not a philosopher is primarily interested in, or attached to, a specific order
or policy; the political philosopher is primarily interested in, or attached to,
the truth.
LEO STRAUSS, 'What is PoliticalPhilosophy?", in WHAT IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY?
AND OTHER STUDIES 9, 12 (1959).
In other words, the distinction involves the difference between an authentic quest
for and love of the truth on the one hand, and a constant exchange of competing
ideologies on the other. The distinction is important here since, as we shall see, an
'objective' presentation of religion necessarily precludes the notion of truth. Such a
presentation more closely resembles ideology than it does religion and, therefore,
simply becomes one of many equally valid (or more appropriately, invalid) ways of
understanding the world.
221See Mozert v. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1987); Smith v. Bd.
of Sch. Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 693 (11th Cir. 1987).
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but as a way of life? By attempting to conform to the principle of
equal treatment, would the Haynes and Nord approach simply
homogenize and trivialize all religious worldviews?
Again, as Haynes and Nord point out, neutrality requires
one to bracket the truth question whenever religion is presented
in the public school curriculum. 222 To present religion without
reference to truth, however, only presents an impoverished
version of religion. 223 It is like getting rid of the architect while
keeping the building or doing away with the lawgiver while
claiming protection of the law. 224
A merely historical
presentation of a particular way of life, as one critic has
225
forcefully argued, can sap it of its vitality.
According to Friedrich Nietzsche, 226 life and culture in the
227
West have always been connected to human greatness.
Greatness describes those strong-willed individuals who are
assured of the righteousness and nobility of whatever cause to
which they choose to wholeheartedly devote themselves. Such
individuals are willing to make sacrifices and endure suffering
for what they deem to be a 'higher' cause. Among the 'highest
things' 228 (at least in the West), truth has reigned supreme in
religious and philosophical circles. Indeed, one is reminded of
the Socratic dictum that "life without ... examination is not
222 HAYNES

& NORD, TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION 48 ("We obviously cannot use

the truth of a religion as our criterion for whether to include it, for we cannot
assume judgments about truth if we are to be neutral.").
223 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
224 See HUMAN RIGHTS, supranote 173, at 153.
225 It is interesting to note that Friedrich Nietzsche, arguably the greatest critic
of religion, was also the greatest critic of the modern academic discipline of history.
Nietzsche's basic hypothesis in ON THE ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE OF HISTORY
FOR LIFE was that the discipline of history, introduced in Germany in the
nineteenth century, has robbed the whole of Western culture of its vitality. See
infra pp. 34-36.
226 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900) is one of the most famous and
controversial figures in German philosophy. His views on humanity, history, and
religion have been hailed by many and condemned by others. Some of his works
include HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, THUS SPAKE
ZARATHUSTRA, THE WILL TO POWER, and ECCE HOMO. See Biography Resource
Center,
Nietzsche,
Friedrich
(Wilhelm)
(2000),
at
http://www.biography.com/searchIarticle.jsp?aid=9423452&search=
(last visited
Mar. 22, 2004); see generally RONALD HAYMAN, NIETZSCHE: A CRITICAL LIFE 1
(1980).
227 See CLAUDE NICHOLAS PAVUR, NIETZSCHE HUMANIST 110-11 (1998).
228 "Highest things" mean the traditional ends of human desire: truth,
goodness, and beauty.
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worth living." 229 One is also reminded of the "Agony in the
230
Garden" narrative, particularly as recounted in Luke's Gospel.
Both examples represent an utter devotion unto death to some
higher cause.
Nietzsche argued, however, that the modern academic
discipline of history has revealed a kind of truth that is radically
different from the original philosophical or theological concept of
truth.231 The discipline of history replaced the speculative quest
or contemplative wondering unique to the philosophical or
religious enterprise with a professional philosophy of scholarship
and criticism. What scholarship and criticism beget, however, is
not truth, but only further scholarship and criticism. This
discipline of history simply presents one with a vast survey of
conflicting worldviews of the many cultures that have existed
throughout space and time. The discipline of history and the
truth it discloses are dangerous to human life, according to
Nietzsche, because human life needs a "horizon"-a permanent
object to which one can be devoted. 232 History, however, tends to
teach that everything is in a constant state of flux. Thus, all of
the horizons that have given civilizations their respective
meanings and values are perceived to be artificial, conventional
and, most importantly, without absolute significance.
All
horizons then collapse, since none can claim to be superior to the
other. Indeed, this is the "deadly truth"233 that the academic
discipline of history reveals.

229 PLATO, SOCRATES ON TRIAL: THE APOLOGY, in THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES
43, 72 (Hugh Tredennick trans., Penguin Books 1969). Plato also wrote:

[Tihe difficulty is not so much to escape death; the real difficulty is to
escape from doing wrong, which is far more fleet of foot. In this present
instance I, the slow old man, have been overtaken by the slower of the two,
but my accusers, who are clever and quick, have been overtaken by the
faster: by iniquity. When I leave this court I shall go away condemned by
you to death, but they will go away convicted by Truth herself of depravity
and wickedness. And they accept their sentence even as I accept mine.
Id. at 73.
230 Luke 22: 39-46 (New American) ("Father, if it is your will, take this cup
from me; yet not my will but yours be done.'... In his anguish... his sweat became
like drops of blood falling to the ground.").
231 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE ADVANTAGE AND

DISADVANTAGE OF HISTORY

FOR LIFE 7 (Peter Preuss trans., Hackett Publishing 1980).
232 Id. at 8-14, 38-43.
233 Id. at 23 ("fiat veritas pereat vita"--"Let there be truth, and may life
perish").
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Nietzsche pointed out that modern Western culture is not a
23 4
culture in itself, but represents only knowledge of cultures.
"[W]e moderns have nothing at all," he wrote, "only by filling and
overfilling ourselves with alien ages, customs, arts, philosophies,
religions and knowledge do we become something worthy of
notice." 235 Modern culture, according to Nietzsche, is dead
because its indecisiveness inhibits it from moving forward; it
"may well sleep like the snake which, having swallowed whole
rabbits, calmly lies in the sun and avoids all movement except
the most necessary."236 The discipline of history substitutes
speculation or contemplation with an overload of trivial
knowledge, creating "weak personaht[ies]" or "walking
encyclopedias" for whom little, if anything, is at stake. 237 The
same goes for historical religious knowledge:
What can one learn from Christianity, that as a result of a
historicizing treatment it has become blas6 and unnatural until
finally a completely historical ... treatment has resolved it into
pure knowledge about Christianity and so has annihilated it,
all this one can study in everything that has life: that it ceases
to live when it has been dissected completely and lives painfully
and becomes sick once one begins to practise historical
238
dissection on it.
Of course, Haynes and Nord were aware of the nihilistic
dangers of historicism. 239
Indeed, their exhortation to
distinguish between "pluralism and relativism '240 appears to be
an attempt to fend off the potential annihilation of religion in the
historical context. Yet to learn about past peoples who had much
at stake is one thing, but to be an actual stakeholder is
something else. There is a kind of inherent arrogance in the
'teaching about religion' enterprise that makes the student
believe that she is approaching the subject from some higher,
unbiased, and more comprehensive viewpoint. 24 1 This enterprise
is perceived as a vantage point of safety, transcending the dark
clouds of divisive controversy, since the student can refrain from
234 Id.
235
236

at 24.

Id.
Id.

237 Id. at 24-25.
238 Id. at 40.
239
240
241

See supra Part IV.
See id.
See id.
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making any kind of commitment with respect to a particular
religion. The arrogance is naive, however, and hardly provides
protection. For, if one is to be fully consistent with the truth of
history, one must acknowledge that the historical viewpoint
242
itself is just one among many possible perspectives.
To be sure, Haynes and Nord had noble aspirations in
implementing religion into the curriculum. Religious education
is enormously important both from a moral and historical
perspective. However, it seems that in their valiant effort to
transcend the cultural forces that have silenced religion in the
public square, they have been unable to escape the burdensome
yoke of historicism that tends to relativize and trivialize religion.
The objective method by which they proposed to implement
religion into the public schools is infected with the capacity to
produce subjective fruits. The neutrality toward religion they
advocated can in fact have the effect of neutralizing religious
values.
The Court, too, expressed leeriness with respect to this
implementation under the auspices of the Government, often
times following Madison's
argument that
government
entanglement with religion tends to produce "pride and
indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in
both, superstition, bigotry and persecution."243 Justice Black's
extensive historical analysis in Engel v. Vitale, for example,
pointed to the avoidance of the degradation of religion as the
primary purpose of the Establishment Clause. 24 4
The
"unhallowed perversion" of religion by government, he argued,
resulted in a loss of respect for religion. 245
Justice Brennan has also been quite suspicious of the
Government on these matters. 246 In his concurrence in Lemon,
for example, he expressed some concern over a Rhode Island
program that required Catholic schoolteachers to vow not to
242 HUMAN RIGHTS, note 173, at 11 ("Differently stated, if the vaunted pluralism

of our liberal democratic system is to have any meaning, it must exclude its
opposite; for, like every other 'ism' it, too, is a monism. Its basic premise, asserted
absolutely, recoils upon itself. This leaves us with a neutrality that is more
apparent than real.").
243 MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, supra note 14,
7, at 302.
This
observation, incidentally, is not unlike that of Nietzsche.
244 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
245 Id. at 431-32.
246 See infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
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introduce religion into secular subjects. 247 Such a program,
Brennan argued, ran the risk of all-out "secularization of a
creed."248 This language was repeated some fourteen years later
in Aguilar when Brennan denounced a New York statute
monitoring
of parochial
mandating
the
governmental
schoolteachers. 249 Also, writing for the majority in Ball, Justice
Brennan warned, not only of the indoctrinating effects of the
State's school aid program, but also of the effects of the
"corrosive secularism" a government can impose on religion. 250
Justice Blackmun picked up this language in his dissent in
Bowen v. Kendrick,25 1 where he expressed similar concern over
the Government's capacity to destroy the Church's irreplaceable
role in addressing social problems. 252 Finally, Justice Souter, in
his dissent from Zelman, invoked Madison's Memorial in
pointing out the potential problems with government restrictions
on the Cleveland parochial schools. 253 Such schools were already
forbidden, he noted, from hiring teachers and administrators of
their own religious stripe. 254 Arguably even more intrusive was
the potential for the restrictions to "prohibit religions from
teaching traditionally legitimate articles of faith as to the error,
sinfulness, or ignorance of others, if they want government
255
money for their schools."
Perhaps for the sake of religion, then, equal treatment in the
public school curriculum is not a position the Court ought to
embrace because neutrality in this context tends to denigrate
rather than elevate religion. In fact, the neutrality advocated by
Haynes and Nord-that is, equal treatment in the form of an
objective presentation of religion-dilutes religion from its
essential character and runs the risk of flattening the soul of the
247

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 650 (1971).

248 Id.

249 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) ("[IThe picture of state inspectors

prowling the halls of parochial schools and auditing classroom instruction surely
raises more than an imagined specter of governmental 'secularization of a creed.'"
(quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 650)).
250 Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985).
251 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding a federal statute which
granted funds for research to both secular and religious organizations in addressing
the problem of teenage pregnancy).
252 Id. at 640 n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
253 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 712-13 (2002).
254 Id.
255 Id. at 713.
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religious child. Perhaps this is one area where the Court is on
the mark in retaining its former separatist understanding of
neutrality toward religion, despite the potential for hostility. In
his essay, "The Regime of Separatism," the late theologian and
political theorist, Ernest L. Fortin wrote:
If the state is indifferent to religion or, at the very least, to the
distinction between religions, chances are that most of its
citizens will be indifferent to it as well. Better in a way that
the government should be straightforwardly antagonistic
toward Christianity, for such antagonism usually has the effect
of strengthening the resolve of believers, as it did during the
early centuries and still does in some parts of the world
today.... [B]y according the same respect to all religions,
[neutrality] implicitly denies that any of them has an intrinsic
claim to this respect. To that extent, it inevitably works
against religion, for few people are likely to acquiesce in the
stringent moral demands made on them by their religion unless
256
they believe in it, heart and soul.
One might then ask with some desperation: "What are we to
do?" Again, the fundamental purpose of this article was to
survey neutrality toward religion in the curricular landscape and
to critique its prominent spokesmen from the point of view of
religion. One might ask further what purpose such a critique
could possibly serve in addressing the problem at hand. Fortin
provided us with a subtly optimistic answer: "[Tihe flood of
books, pamphlets, and reports on education with which we are
currently being inundated is as much a symptom of the decay of
the contemporary educational scene as it is of its renewed
vitality."25 7 This observation, while judgmental of critics, is not
without hope for this age of criticism. Later on in the same
essay Fortin wrote:
Hopeless as the situation may appear to be to some people, it
nevertheless has a relative advantage over other, more stable
situations. Insofar as it is characterized by the shaking of all
traditions and cultural horizons, it allows for a reconsideration
of the fundamental human alternatives in ways that would
have been impossible at other moments in our history. The
sense of disintegration that so many of our thoughtful
contemporaries have begun to experience is itself an invitation

256
257

HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 173, at 11.
Id. at 29.
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to undertake a fresh or nontraditional assessment of these
traditions .... The extremity into which we have fallen could
258
indeed be our greatest opportunity.
CONCLUSION

The Court's own understanding of 'neutrality' in the
educational context has, in a sense, become more amicable
towards religion, insofar as those associated with religion can
now enjoy some of the benefits, accessibility, and aid that were
once limited strictly to public institutions. When it comes to the
public school curriculum, however, religion has not achieved the
same elevated status warranting equal treatment. For some,
this is fundamentally unjust and calls for a pro-active campaign,
complete with detailed implementation strategies for introducing
religion back into the public school curriculum. Nevertheless
such proposals, at least as envisioned by Charles Haynes and
Warren Nord, make the fatal mistake of forsaking the essence of
religion; namely, truth. The result of such "objectivity" in
religious education amounts to the very religious indifference
that their program sets out to abolish. Therefore, the Court's
separatist position on this issue is perhaps better than the
proposed alternative. Whether another more prudent course of
action may supercede the status quo is a question that remains
open and one to which we must pay constant attention.

258

Id. at 43-44.
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